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An interdisciplinary approach in identifying the legitimate regulator of anti-
doping in sport: The case of the Australian Football League. 
 
Abstract: 
The regulation of anti-doping practices in Australian sport is overseen by the 
Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA), which is a statutory authority 
funded by the Australian Commonwealth Government (ACG). The 2013 ASADA 
investigation into the Essendon Football Club (EFC) uncovered the alleged use of 
performance and image enhancing drugs by a number of players and support personnel.  
However, despite the call for sanctions to be placed on those taking banned substances, 
ASADA itself became the central focus of enquiry with the EFC questioning the 
legitimacy of ASADA’s authority in their management of the investigation.   Using 
content analysis and Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, this paper aims to determine the 
legitimate regulatory authority of key actors involved in the EFC investigation. The 
findings suggest actors in the social field, as related to the case of the EFC investigation, 
possess varying amounts and types of capital, which cumulatively convert to symbolic 
capital. Dominant actors within the social field retain more symbolic capital than others 
and are perceived to possess legitimate regulatory authority, which does not translate to 
actual legal authority.  This apparent disconnect between perceived authority on the one 
hand and actual legal legitimacy on the other has implications for the future 
management of such cases, both in the Australian Football League and beyond. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Doping in sport has been a topic of great interest to scholars across a variety of 
disciplines from law, management and medicine, to name a few (Fridman & Buti, 2001; 
Newton, 2013; Stewart, Adair, & Smith, 2011). In Australia, the regulation of doping in 
professional football is a topic that has generated significant scholarly attention in recent 
times due to issues confronting the Australian Football League (AFL) and the Essendon 
Football Club (EFC). 
In February 2013, a joint presentation, involving Australian Federal Government 
Ministers and senior executives of a number of sport governing bodies, responded to 
damaging reports alleging systemic doping practices within a number of elite 
professional sports in Australia (Gordon, 2013). As such, fundamental questions arose 
as to the management, regulation and governance of the promotion and enforcement of 
the Australian anti-doping regime (Australian Crime Commission, 2013) and resulted in 
a joint media presentation labeled as the “blackest day in Australian sport” (Gordon, 
2013). In this paper, we question whether the orchestration of this joint media 
presentation reinforced the need for collaboration among government and non-
government actors to jointly tackle anti-doping in the Australian sports system. 
Specifically, our research question addresses the relationship between organisational 
capital and legitimacy in the regulation of doping in sport. 
This paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach by applying social capital theory 
in the context of anti-doping regulation in Australian sport, in order to determine levels 
of organisational capital among key actors.  More specifically, the joint investigation 
into the doping issues in Australian football and the EFC resulted in a variety of actors 
attempting to assert authority in the regulation of anti-doping in Australia. As a result, 
there was confusion as to which actor was the legitimate regulator, and whether or not 
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that actor had the necessary authority and regulatory power to control doping regulation 
in this country. For the purpose of this paper, a regulator can include government and 
non-government actors in charge of establishing rules and regulations to be followed by 
others within that regulatory domain. 
The notion of capital and regulatory authority within sport organisations is not 
new to sport management as researchers have investigated the role of capital to 
influence change both within organisations and the organisational fields within which 
they operate (Cousens & Slack, 2005; O'Brien & Slack, 2003; Stewart et al., 2011). 
However, the link between capital, regulation and the legitimate authority of an 
organisation has remained surprisingly under-investigated within sport management 
research. Previous research has identified dominant stakeholders within an 
organisational field in relation to the levels of capital they possess (O'Brien & Slack, 
2003, 2004; Stewart et al., 2011). However, no studies have addressed the connection 
between the legal regulatory authority of actors and the perceived levels of 
organisational capital possessed by these actors.  
In the context of this paper, we argue that legal regulatory authority (or 
legitimate authority) can derive from contractual or legislative sources and is thought to 
underpin the legitimacy of the authority that organisations seek to exert within their 
organisational field. The concept of regulation is applied in order to determine what 
organisation has the power to legitimately regulate anti-doping in Australian sport. The 
paper also investigates those organisations that are perceived to have legitimate 
authority within a given social field, which is determined by the capital they possess as 
opposed to the legislative authority awarded them.  Thus, the inclusion of legal 
authority in this discussion surrounding regulation and legitimacy seeks to contribute to 
the identified gap in the literature. 
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Through the application of Bourdieu’s social theory and using content analysis, 
we seek to determine the nature of individual capital possessed by the actors involved in 
the EFC doping allegations and the subsequent joint investigation by the AFL and 
ASADA. An examination of legal and regulatory instruments provided a means to 
determine the legitimate authority afforded to those organisations being examined. We 
posed the question, ‘what is the relationship between organisational capital and 
legitimacy in the regulation of doping in sport?’ To address this question, our goals 
were to: (1) identify the key actors involved in the EFC doping allegation; (2) identify 
the type and level of capital each actor possessed; (3) establish the perceived authority 
associated with the different types and levels of capital; and last, (4) determine the 
legitimate authority of each actor within the doping in sport social field, based upon the 
extent of their legal authority. In other words, government actors as state regulators act 
within the parameters of their legislative powers given under the relevant legislative 
instrument. Non-government actors do not have the legislative authority but may 
possess other forms of legal and regulatory authority that is often of equal significance.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
To assist in understanding the regulation and governance of anti-doping in 
Australia and specifically, in the analysis of the case of the EFC, Pierre Bourdieu’s 
social theory concepts were applied. Bourdieu’s social theory has been adopted by a 
number of sport management researchers (Augestad, Bergsgard, & Hansen, 2006; 
O'Brien & Slack, 2003).  Indeed, Kitchin and Howe (2013) believe the use of 
Bourdieu’s work can lead sport management researchers to a greater understanding of 
the, “interplay between micro and macro pressures within the organisational field” (p. 
132). 
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Bourdieu’s contribution to sociology revolves around three key concepts: social 
field, capital and habitus (Swartz, 1997). Bourdieu did not examine organisations per se; 
instead, he sought to understand the setting (social field) in which actors (agents and 
stakeholders) operated. According to Everett (2002), Bourdieu examined the struggle of 
actors attempting to achieve power, prestige and influence over those within the social 
field. As such, Bourdieu sees organisations in relational contexts that can only act 
within a given social field. 
2.1 Social Field 
The concept of the ‘social field’ is central to understanding Bourdieu’s social 
capital theory. Bourdieu (1990) described the social field as, “networks of social 
relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or maneuvers 
take place over resources, stakes and access” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). In other words, 
this ‘field of action’ sees particular capital valued or devalued by the actors occupying 
the social field, through the intersections between relations of power that determine the 
dominant actors within the field. 
The social field contains dominant and dominated actors that aim to establish 
supremacy over other actors within the field through the use of power, influence and 
domination (Everett, 2002). The dominant actors possess various forms of capital that 
contribute to their perceived power and status within the social field. Conflict and 
competition occurs among actors as they attempt to, “accumulate, conserve or convert 
different types of capital” into influence and authority (Ihlen, 2007, p. 270). Within a 
social field, authority, influence and prestige vary among actors, as each attempts to 
accumulate capital, which is seen as a source of power (Swartz, 1997).  
According to Pellandini-Simanyi (2014), “fields are organised around specific 
stakes that all participants of the given field pursue. These stakes are always a form of 
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symbolic power, which is granted on different grounds in each field” (p. 656). In the 
case of the EFC, these stakes could represent reputation, drug-free sport and authority. 
Bourdieu (1990) suggested that actors engage in a constant struggle to maintain or 
improve their position within the social field by creating reliable access to these stakes. 
Indeed, Bourdieu (1996) believed each field participant attempts to, “impose boundaries 
within the field that are most favourable to its interests” (p. 223).  
In the social field examined in this research, the involved actors include the 
AFL, ASADA, ACG, AFL clubs (including the EFC), fans, sponsors, sport broadcasters 
and the wider mass media. In Australia, the AFL dominates the sporting landscape, as 
the preeminent spectator sport in the country (Australian Government, 2015). 
Furthermore, Australian Rules football participation in club-level leagues continues to 
dominate other participation sports around the nation (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2015). As a result, the AFL has developed significant authority, reputation and 
popularity within the Australian sport culture, and has done so in a manner consistent 
with values related to drug-free participation. In this sense, the AFL is a dominant force 
that has accumulated significant levels of capital within the social field examined in this 
research.  
2.2. Capital 
Bourdieu (1985) identified several types of capital including; economic, 
symbolic, social and cultural. Interestingly, Bourdieu believed symbolic capital relates 
to the symbolic power of the actor, where authority, knowledge and reputation are used 
to influence behaviour within the social field. According to Sideri (2004), power is 
essential in “any analysis seeking to explain action” (p. 66). As Bourdieu (1985) 
explained, “in the struggle to impose the legitimate view of the social world, agents 
[actors] yield power proportionate to their symbolic capital” (p. 731). Symbolic capital 
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in its simplest form is often seen as a collection of economic, social and cultural capital; 
however, it is also a function of an actor’s status and reputation (Stewart et al., 2011). 
Bourdieu (1984) implies symbolic capital accrues as the residual effect of actors 
claiming status, building reputation and securing social gravitas. As such, symbolic 
capital can also be defined as, “a reputation for competence and an image of 
respectability and honorability” (Bourdieu, 1984, p.291).  Thus, an actor’s symbolic 
capital is the perceived power to make things happen as a result of the legitimate 
position occupied in the field (Bourdieu, 1985). This notion of ‘legitimate position’ 
refers to the collective symbolic capital an actor possesses in the social field that 
contributes to the perceived power and influence they wield within that social field.  
It is worth noting that Bourdieu calls “legitimate power symbolic power, by 
which he means the kind of power that is reinforced by authority (as opposed to, say, 
sheer force)” (p. 655). However, power and authority as defined by Bourdieu are 
contained to the social field in which an actor occupies. Thus, Bourdieu’s use of the 
concept ‘legitimate power’ is different from the concept of ‘legitimate authority’, a term 
we have used throughout this paper to reflect the legislative power an organisation may 
possess, that is not necessarily confined to a social field. These concepts are discussed 
further in the following section. 
Consequently, symbolic capital is therefore misrecognised in the social field. In 
other words, “symbolic capital operates through misrecognition as authority and the 
power to shape main-stream understandings and is often premised on taken for granted 
perceptions of the social world” (Sideri, 2004, p. 67). The notion of ‘misrecognition’ 
pertains to the manner by which power is perceived by other individuals within the 
social field. Where symbolic capital is grounded on actors’ misrecognition of authority 
and power, a vicious cycle can evolve within a social field where the production of 
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symbolic capital serves to reproduce the field’s social order (Sideri, 2004). Thus, those 
actors with significant symbolic capital within a given social field are perceived by 
other actors as legitimate regulators of that social space, even without the actual legal 
authority to regulate behaviour. As a result, their symbolic power is a source of 
influence over the behaviours, values and norms of the social field (Ihlen, 2007).  
Social capital, on the other hand, refers to an actor’s network of acquaintances, 
which contributes to the power and resources the actor acquires within the social field 
(Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Social capital adds value to the perceived symbolic 
capital of an actor within the social field.  Thus, it is suggested that all forms of capital 
(economic, social, cultural) are interconnected and as a result are converted to symbolic 
capital, making it the definitive source of power (Everett, 2002). As a result, those 
actors with the most power attempt to alter relational dynamics in the social field 
through shifts in logics, norms and values (Washington & Patterson, 2011). 
2.3 Habitus 
The term “habitus” refers to a set of acquired values, dispositions, perceptions 
and appreciations which give meaning to our practices (Bourdieu, 1990). Habitus, 
therefore, is a structure or system that provides strategies for actors within the field by 
which to relate to the social world (Ihlen, 2007).  It is seen as a “structured structure” by 
the effects of the actions and interactions with others in the social space, and also as a 
“structuring structure” in that it advocates and constrains future actions (Bourdieu, 
1990). 
According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), a habitus is based on all the 
situations through which dispositions are created and stems from individual experiences 
throughout a lifetime. Therefore, each member of the social field brings to it a habitus 
formed from past experiences and conditions. Building on this work, Emirbayer and 
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Johnson (2008) suggested that by examining habitus and the micro-processes of 
individual behaviour within a social field, a deeper understanding of the development of 
organisational and relational structures occurs. 
The connection between habitus and the social field is termed doxa and is 
defined by Bourdieu (1990) as, “the interrelationship of immediate adherence that is 
established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned” (p. 68). In 
other words, the doxa may control the barriers to actors entering the social field. A 
social field can be described as the ‘space of play’ and the interaction between habitus 
and the field thought of as ‘a feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1990).  
The use of Bourdieu’s social theory for this research aims to determine the type 
and level of capital possessed by both ASADA and the AFL in relation to their 
respective roles in the investigation into the EFC doping allegations. The use of 
Bourdieu’s concepts are not new to sport management research, as investigation into 
organisational behaviour and organisational change within sport organisations is a 
popular research paradigm (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009; Houlihan, 2013; 
O'Brien & Slack, 2003, 2004; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011; Slack & Hinings, 1992).  
O’Brien and Slack (2003; 2004) engaged Bourdieu’s work in their investigation of the 
mechanisms of change in the professionalisation of English rugby union. Their findings 
highlighted that the social field reflects the habitus of dominant agents; thus, change 
occurs when new actors in possession of legitimate forms of capital enter the field and 
alter prevailing logics in accord with their own habitus. Similarly, research from 
Cousens and Slack (2005) and Washington and Ventresca (2008), examined field-level 
conflict and organisational change as a result of new entrants into the field. 
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More specific to sport doping, a study by Stewart et al., (2011) examined illicit-
drug regulation policy using Bourdieu’s three primary concepts as outlined above. The 
use of Bourdieu’s model of social behavior determined that: 
The accumulation of capital can shore up the power base of a class or collective 
habitus and highlights the ways in which this power can be used to impose 
values and dispositions on other agents and organisations, and consequently 
dominate a social field (p. 241).  
The recent case of EFC and the investigation into doping allegations leveled 
against it calls into question the conclusions made by Stewart et al., (2011). The 
protracted nature of the case is essentially the product of a contestation over the 
legitimacy of the symbolic capital and related authority possessed by the field’s 
dominant actors. Therefore, this research extends the work of Stewart et al., (2011) by 
first, determining the dominant actors within the regulation of doping in Australian 
sport and then identifying the legitimate authority those dominant actors possess within 
this social field. Furthermore, examining the habitus within the organisational field will 
highlight the dominant actor/s responsible for the values and behaviours occurring 
within this social space. According to Kitchin and Howe (2013), understanding social 
habitus in sport management is under-researched, and they call for further research that 
offers a relational analysis of field, capital and habitus to determine aspects of power 
within the management of sport. In addition, they suggest future research could examine 
how organisations gain capital and what field strategies are implemented by the 
dominant organisations in the social field in order to maintain levels of power and 
control. This paper incorporates these suggestions to determine the legitimate authority 
of actors involved in the investigation of the EFC, and the strategies they employ to 
maintain their legitimate authority. A brief background to the EFC doping allegations 
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and subsequent investigation is required to provide an understanding of the social field 
examined in this paper. 
 
3. Background to the Study 
 
 Drug-free status is the central plank that underpins the international conventions 
against doping in sport embodied in the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Code – 
the universal statement of anti-doping policy that is practiced globally (WADA, 2014).  
It is a well-researched area across many disciplines with the unified purpose of 
understanding the concept of pure performance in sport (Corlett, 2013; Dickinson & 
Quirk, 2010; Eichner, 2008 & Houlihan, 2014). 
 The Australian sports system is a top-down hierarchy overseen by the federal 
government. The Australian Sports Commission (ASC), a federal agency, is the 
government body responsible for overseeing the governance, management and funding 
of National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) which are responsible for domestic 
competition and achieving success at international sporting competition  (Australian 
Sports Commission, 2009b).  ASADA, also a federal agency funded by the ACG, works 
in partnership with the ASC to ensure drug-free sport in Australia. 
 3.1 Anti-Doping Regulation in Australia 
 Australia was a signatory to the 2004 Copenhagen Declaration and the 2005 
UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport, agreeing to bring the 
Australian anti-doping regime into compliance with the WADA Code and the 
international movement to preserve the integrity of sport from the threats posed by 
doping (Thorpe, Buti, Davies, Fridman, & Jonson, 2013).  After amending the existing 
legislative powers and the limited role of the former regulator, the Australian Sports 
Drug Agency (ASDA), the ACG introduced the Australian Sports Anti-Doping 
Authority Act in 2006 and replaced ASDA with a new regulator, ASADA, with a vastly 
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expanded role conferring substantial additional investigative powers. ASADA operates 
as a statutory regulator, acting independent of any influence from government or sport 
organisations and is unfettered in the execution of its functions (Andrews, 2005; Lundy, 
2006).  
 The National Anti-Doping Scheme (NAD Scheme) was enacted under the 
ASADA Act and establishes the regulatory framework that ASADA must follow in 
implementing the objectives of the ASADA Act, which in turn, embody the WADA 
Code (ASADA, 2006a). As such, ASADA is vested with the legislative authority to 
regulate the WADA code, investigate suspected doping rule violations and enforce the 
Anti-Doping Rule Violations under the WADA Code within Australian sport.  ASADA 
therefore, has the legislative power to issue show cause notices for suspected Anti-
Doping Rule Violations and to refer matters to the Anti-Doping Rule Violation Panel 
for determination (ASADA, 2006a, 2006b).   
 Amendments made to the ASADA Act in 2013 significantly increased the 
investigative powers of ASADA by enabling the CEO to issue disclosure notices 
against athletes and their support personnel suspected of participating in doping.  These 
notices enhanced the evidence-gathering function of ASADA and prescribed significant 
penalties for non-compliance (ASADA, 2006a). As indicated above, despite its status as 
a government agent, ASADA should act independent of political or other interference in 
executing its functions as the regulator of the anti-doping regime in Australian sport. 
    3.2   The Australian Crime Commission Report 
The Australian anti-doping regime was predicated on the platform of athlete 
health and welfare and public interest policies in preserving the integrity and “spirit” of 
sport (Thorpe et al., 2013).  An investigation by the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) in 2011 uncovered evidence of systemic doping practices and widespread use of 
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Performance and Image Enhancing Drugs (PIEDs) within two of the professional 
football codes played at the elite level in Australia.  These allegations threatened the 
integrity of sport by drawing links between doping in sport and organised crime 
(Australian Crime Commission, 2013). Up until the release of the ACC Report in 2013, 
doping issues in team sports in Australia had been confined to a few cases of individual 
players within teams and had never arisen in the context of systemic doping practices 
involving an entire team (Moston, Engelberg & Skinner, 2015) . 
   3.3 The Australian Football League  
 One of the football codes implicated in the ACC Report was Australian 
rules football, Australia’s most popular spectator sport, with annual revenue in 2013 of 
$446 million and total annual attendance figures exceeding 6.3 million spectators with 
an average game attendance of 32,000 (AFL, 2013a). Australian rules football, formerly 
known as Victorian rules football, originated in Victoria in 1877 and is Australia’s 
oldest non-indigenous sport (Linnell, 1995). The Australian Football League (AFL), as 
a company limited by guarantee, is the national governing body of the code.  The AFL 
is responsible for the organisation and regulation of the national competition involving 
18 licensed teams with 810 active players (Harcourt, Marclay, & Clothier, 2014). In 
terms of revenue and value of its broadcasting and licensing rights, the AFL dominates 
the Australian sporting landscape and is financially independent of government, yet 
benefits from partnerships and pathway programs with the ACG (AFL, 2013a). 
 The allegations in the ACC Report were made against a number of 
professional clubs, players and support personnel suspected of engaging in systemic 
doping practices in the 2012 season (Australian Crime Commission, 2013). One of the 
18 clubs participating in the AFL is the Essendon Football Club (EFC). Upon being 
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identified as one of the clubs under investigation, the EFC self-reported its involvement 
in the alleged doping practices to ASADA (Evans, 2013). 
 3.4     The ASADA/AFL Investigation 
 Following the actions by the EFC in self-reporting, the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of ASADA and the AFL entered into an agreement and commenced a 
joint-investigation into the legality of the supplements program at EFC (Harcourt et al., 
2014). Harcourt et al., (2014) concluded that one of the reasons for this collaboration 
was the extensive financial and non-financial resources available to the AFL. These 
resources included the forensic capabilities of the AFL investigators and its internal 
integrity unit, together with the AFL’s considerable financial resources. Further, the 
tripartite contractual nexus existing between the AFL, the clubs and the players, enabled 
the AFL to assert legal authority over registered players to compel them to co-operate in 
the execution of ASADA’s functions (Andruska, 2014). The investigation was to last 
for seven months, involving 130 interviews and collaboration between AFL and 
ASADA integrity investigators and technical experts. The cost to the AFL of the joint 
investigation was estimated to be $1.3 million (Harcourt et al., 2014). The information 
gathered during this investigation led to the issuing of show cause notices against 34 
EFC players under the NAD Scheme. In addition, the AFL imposed sanctions upon the 
EFC and a number of support personnel and officials (AFL, 2013b). Immediately 
following the issue of show cause notices against the EFC players, Federal Court 
proceedings were filed by the EFC against the CEO of ASADA alleging that the joint 
investigation was beyond the scope of ASADA’s authority (Australian Federal 
Government, 2014a). The EFC claimed that the joint investigation was invalid and 
sought an order setting aside the notices issued to the 34 EFC players (Australian 
Federal Government, 2014a). The EFC Court Proceedings were heard before Justice 
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John Middleton of the Federal Court of Australia in August 2014 and a decision was 
delivered on 19 September 2014.  The Court determined that ASADA was not acting 
outside its powers and complied with the rule of law in establishing and conducting the 
EFC investigation (Australian Federal Government, 2014b). Of significance in the case 
was the evidence that suggested confusion as to the legitimate authority of ASADA and 
the AFL in the management of the anti-doping regime. Further, the revelations in the 
evidence suggested the AFL and ACG applied pressure to ASADA, raising questions as 
to the legitimacy of the ‘independent’ status of ASADA. While the Federal Court’s 
decision is significant to establish the legal legitimacy of ASADA based on a narrow 
construction of its regulatory power, the commencement of the proceedings was 
precipitated on the basis of confusion as to regulatory actors, their responsibilities and 
external pressures brought to bear on getting a result.  Hence, this paper assays those 
actors involved in the EFC case and evaluates the legitimacy of their authority within 
the context of doping in Australian sport by examining the nexus between regulation, 
capital and legitimacy. 
 4. Regulation and Legitimacy  
For the purpose of this paper, and to contextualise regulation as being more than 
government action based on legislative authority, Black’s (2002) approach to regulation 
is applied and taken to mean any intentional action by an actor designed to alter or 
influence the behaviour of others. The ‘others’ in the context of regulation are classified 
as ‘regulates’ or targets whose behaviours are intended to be altered or influenced by the 
regulatory interventions. Regulation is pervasive and in some cases operates quietly to 
shape and preserve social order within a particular context (Freiberg, 2010). In other 
cases, regulation is obvious and easily identifiable. In all cases, regulation is much 
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broader than just reference to government intervention and extends to non-government 
actors who are in positions to alter or influence the behaviour of others. 
4.1 Regulation 
Regulatory authority in the present context of the Australian anti-doping regime 
is taken to be the legal authority that establishes the legitimacy of the actor.  The term 
‘legitimacy’ in the context of this paper suggests the lawful authority of an actor to 
regulate in a way that ultimately influences the behaviour of others.  The role of 
government as a dominant actor in the social field leaves the substantive elements to 
others to implement, interpret and enforce rules relevant to its environment.  This 
‘hands off’ approach to regulation does not mean that government disappears altogether. 
Westerman (2010) suggests that the biggest deterrent to regulatory reconfiguration is 
the threat of ‘substantive self-regulation’ where government stands ready to intervene 
and impose onerous and less benevolent forms of regulation should self-regulation fail 
to achieve its regulatory objectives.  According to Parker (2002), achieving a healthy 
balance between external influences of government, stakeholders and communities with 
internal management—described as ‘open’ or ‘permeable’ self-regulation—leads to 
more efficient, effective and legitimate regulation.  
 In the present case, the ACG established ASADA as the state agency whose 
authority and legitimacy is underpinned by legal regulation, this being the ASADA Act 
and NAD Scheme. Consistent with administrative law principles, the function of 
ASADA as a government agency should operate within the legal framework of the 
ASADA Act and operate independent of any political influence or other pressure from 
external participants (ASADA, 2006a). At the time when the ASADA Bill was 
introduced in the Australian Parliament in 2005, the independent and transparent nature 
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of ASADA’s functions received unequivocal bipartisan support (Andrews, 2005; 
Lundy, 2006).  
    The AFL and EFC are non-government actors. In the case of the AFL, its 
legitimacy is referable to its position as the ultimate controller and regulator of the 
national competition of Australian rules football. By having the power to grant clubs 
licenses to participate in the national competition, the AFL’s legitimacy is established 
through contractual arrangements which bestow the power to establish and enforce its 
policies and codes of conduct within its sport (AFL, 2014).  For those reasons, the AFL 
has been classified as a dominant regulator and custodian of its sport (Greenhow & 
East, 2014). The EFC is a club licensed by the AFL to participate in the AFL national 
competition, and this contractual arrangement requires the EFC to comply with AFL 
regulations, player rules and the Anti-Doping Code (AFL, 2014).  In return, the EFC 
receives annual distributions from the AFL.  In 2013, the AFL distributed $209.2million 
to clubs within the national competition, with the EFC receiving $8.4million as part of 
the AFL annual distribution (AFL, 2013a; Essendon, 2013). The EFC itself is the 
employer of players and other persons connected with the EFC’s participation in the 
AFL competition.   
4.2 Legitimacy in regulation 
Regulation attains its legitimacy by being instituted upon a clearly defined and 
evidence-based foundation.  One reason to regulate is when public confidence is 
threatened and citizens look to government to act on their behalf to produce certain 
regulatory outcomes (Parker, 2002). Such is the case with the establishment of ASADA 
and the investment in anti-doping regulation in Australia. However, various definitions 
of ‘legitimacy’ exist and such definitions are often associated with a specific context. 
For example, Suchman (1995) offers a working definition of legitimacy in the context 
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of organisations, suggesting that legitimacy can be viewed as, “a generalised perception, 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (p. 574). 
Similarly, Stewart and Smith (2010) suggested that, “legitimacy is reinforced by 
institutions and people with authority and resources to direct the behaviour and actions 
of others” (p. 189).  In their research, Stewart and Smith (2010) investigated the role of 
ideology in shaping drug use regulation in Australian sport. They concluded that, “sport 
in Australia is value-laden where beliefs and assumptions about social significance 
drive its structure and operation” (p. 194). Hence, ideology is a means of legitimising 
existing hierarchies, securing control and maintaining power. 
Stewart et al., (2011) examined the drivers of illicit drug use regulation in 
Australian sport and concluded that regulatory arrangements around that issue were 
based mainly on intuitive notions on player morality and the social values of sport.  This 
questioned the legitimacy of the regulatory arrangements and suggested that, rather than 
being evidence-based, they were more the product of the ‘ideological will’ of dominant 
stakeholders. Similarly, research conducted by McDermott, Henne and Connor (2013) 
questioned the legitimacy of anti-doping regulation due to the perception that the 
regulatory framework was based upon it being a ‘good thing to do’; thus, being driven 
by values rather than legal foundations. 
This paper analyses the EFC doping case to determine the dominant and 
legitimate regulators with actual authority to influence behaviour within the anti-doping 
social field of Australian sport. The research methods employed will now be presented. 
 
5. Method 
 
Case study research is conducted in a real-life context that allows the 
investigation of a particular situation, event, program or phenomenon (Edwards & 
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Skinner, 2009) and is designed to examine significant factors that occur within a set 
context, rather than examining these factors in isolation (Yin, 2003). The investigation 
into the EFC following the ACC Report allegations is the case examined in this paper. 
In order to provide context and understanding of the case in question, content analysis 
was undertaken. 
5.1 Data Collection 
For this research, government, legislative, court, and organisational documents 
associated with the joint ASADA/AFL investigation into the EFC were collected. The 
nature of these documents was publically accessible and freely available by searching 
the relevant websites.  Further, public interest in the EFC investigation resulted in the 
Federal Court of Australia making the court proceedings and pleadings available freely 
on its website.  In addition, we reviewed the legislative process that underpins the legal 
authority of the anti-doping structure in Australia. Table 1 outlines the materials that 
were collected and examined for this research. The authors acknowledge that certain 
documents, conversations and agreements regarding the EFC investigation and the 
collaboration between the AFL and the EFC may not have been made public, thus 
relying only on the information admitted to the public is a limitation of this research.  
 
__________________  Insert Table 1 here ________________________ 
 
5.2 Data Analysis 
Content analysis can be done on any form of communication, including 
textbooks, journals, emails, websites and reports (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It is used 
to make replicable and valid assumptions from data within a set context, to provide 
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insight, knowledge and the opportunity to guide further research action (Krippendorff, 
2004). In undertaking content analysis of the sources referred to above, data were sorted 
using a deductive approach that incorporated the use of an a priori code template 
(Crabtree & Miller, 1992). According to Neuman (2003), researchers often begin coding 
with a list of codes derived from theories and concepts within a focal area of inquiry. 
In this case, three codes were used to classify the data and to assist in addressing 
the research questions. The codes emerged from an initial review of the literature and 
were aligned to Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, where the researchers attempted to 
identify the key actors in the social field, and the level of capital, legitimacy and 
authority they possessed. In-depth discussions among the researchers occurred to 
finalise the a priori codes and to ensure they would assist in addressing the research 
questions and capture all relevant information effectively. Thus, the a priori codes used 
were: (1) Actors and Organisational Capital; (2) Legitimacy; and, (3) Regulatory 
Authority.   
Once the a priori codes were established, each researcher independently 
examined the documents in order to classify data within each code, with additional 
information that did not apply to the codes allocated to a separate code ‘Other’ to be 
examined at a later date. There were minimal data coded to the ‘Other’ category due to 
the broad nature of the a priori codes, and no disagreement amongst coders as data 
could be placed in one or more of the a priori codes.  
As an example, the type of text coded to the Legitimacy code included: “Under 
the ASADA Act and the NAD scheme established under the Act, ASADA has the 
legislative authority to investigate possible violations of the anti-doping rules…” (AFL, 
2013c, p. 8). The text indicates ASADA’s legitimate authority over the AFL in relation 
to anti-doping violations, hence identifying its legitimacy within the social field being 
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examined. Thus, data within this specific a priori code related to any action taken by the 
actors in regards to the legitimate regulation of anti-doping policies.  
While classifying data into each a priori code, each researcher identified sub-
codes within each a priori code to further assist in the classification of the data. From 
there, the research team collectively examined the sub-codes looking for overlap and a 
way to condense sub-codes through commonalities.  The process of condensing the 
identified sub-codes involved the delineation of codes into major themes that would 
account for all sub-codes. For example, the condensed sub-codes determined by the 
research team for the Legitimacy a priori code included: legislative power; perceived 
legitimacy versus actual legitimacy; and authority.  As a result, a theme within the 
Legitimacy a priori code that reflected the identified sub-codes was; perceived and 
legitimate authority of actors within the social field. In the next section, the themes from 
all a priori codes are presented narratively through direct quotations in order to capture 
the meaning and complexity of phenomena being investigated.  
 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
6.1 Perceived and Legitimate Authority of Actors within the Social Field 
Applying Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, Ihlen (2007) acknowledged that 
actors within a given social field hold varying types and levels of capital which can 
often be perceived as authority to influence and alter behaviour. As noted earlier, 
Bourdieu’s (1985) contention that symbolic capital legitimises an organisation’s 
position in the social field and bestows prestige and reputation is particularly relevant to 
this research.  
In this case, perceptions of legitimacy develop within the social field; thus, 
actors are thought to have a skewed perception of legitimacy due to the habitus that 
provides an unconscious sense of the social world (Pellandini-Simanyi, 2014).  As a 
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result, actors in the social field believe they, “subjectively experience their actions as 
value driven, [however], objectively these normative stances can be shown to be 
conducive to acquiring power” (p. 657). In other words, behaviours by less dominant 
actors are often guided by the need to acquire symbolic capital and power in the social 
field and less by compliance to the legitimate authority (regulator), as dictated by 
legislation. In this case, ASADA is the legitimate regulator; however, the behaviours of 
the AFL and the EFC suggest an attempt to accrue symbolic capital within the social 
field. 
A significant finding in this research highlights the limited power a legitimate 
authority or regulator may have within a given social field. As discussed in Section 3.1, 
ASADA has legislative power in all anti-doping matters in Australian sport. By law, 
ASADA is recognised as the legitimate regulator and is tasked with the power and 
authority to investigate alleged doping in Australian sport. However, relying on 
Bourdieu’s social capital theory, legitimate authority does not necessarily transform into 
legitimate power or symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1990). Therefore, within a social field, 
perceptions of legitimacy have more bearing on behaviour than does legitimate 
authority. For example, ASADA was ineffective in its attempt to investigate the EFC 
doping incident single-handedly. As a result of collaboration with the AFL, ASADA 
was successful in gaining access to players and the undertaking of 130 interviews.  
Bourdieu (1990) suggested that each actor within the social field possesses 
varying levels of capital. Through this capital, perceived legitimacy arises within the 
focal social field, and in this case, the AFL is seen to retain significant levels and types 
of capital. Table 2 outlines the capital possessed by those actors occupying the social 
field in the current case.  
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__________________ Insert Table 2 here _______________________ 
 
 
6.1.1 Perceived authority  
As presented in Table 2, the AFL has comparatively high levels of economic, 
social and cultural capital, which cumulatively, converts into significant symbolic 
capital. As a result, the AFL is perceived to have significant power, prestige and 
authority within this social space and can be considered the dominant actor in the social 
field (Bourdieu, 1985). Consequently, the AFL’s access to power and authority makes it 
well positioned to instill certain dispositions within the social field and influence the 
doxa. Bourdieu (1985) implied the possession of symbolic capital by dominant actors 
provides the means to reproduce the social order within the field. In other words, the 
AFL has created the norms, behaviours and values within the social field that are 
accepted and adopted by the field’s actors.  Since the AFL is deemed to be a dominant 
actor due to the capital it has acquired, the habitus of the social field is not challenged.  
This dominance perhaps explains ASADA’s admission that it, “was not ready for an 
investigation of this magnitude” (McDevitt, 2014), and relied upon the authority and 
legitimacy of the AFL to “assist” with the investigation.  
Furthermore, outlining why ASADA pursued a joint investigation with the AFL in her 
affidavit in Essendon Football Club v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports 
Anti-Doping Authority.   
Aurora Andruska, former CEO of ASADA, made the following statement: 
During the teleconference Mr Clothier said, ‘we have the powers’.  I understood 
him to mean that the AFL would use its powers under its contracts with 
players/officials and its Players Rules, which incorporated its Anti-doping Code, 
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to compel players/officials to attend interviews and to answer questions from 
ASADA investigators truthfully. I said the words, ‘we can use the AFL’s powers 
until we get our own powers’ (Andruska, 2014, paragrah 11). 
Thus, ASADA aimed to accrue power by association with the AFL in order to gain 
access and cooperation from other actors within the social field. As suggested by 
Bourdieu (1985), actors gain legitimacy and power within the social field proportionate 
to their symbolic capital. Therefore, ASADA sought to gain social and symbolic capital 
through their collaboration with the AFL. The issue at hand is the perceived legitimate 
power of the AFL within the social field and as Ihlen (2007) contends, less dominant 
actors’ perceptions of the social order of their field can result from misrecognition of the 
authority and power wielded by dominant actors. As a result, this may have significant 
implications for the determination of the field’s habitus. In this case, ASADA, despite 
legal authority to conduct investigations, was not perceived by actors in the social field 
to be dominant.  This perceived lack of authority prompted ASADA’s decision to 
combine forces with the AFL in an effort to access the AFL’s social and symbolic 
capital so that it could undertake the investigation.   
  The AFL has accrued significant symbolic capital since its establishment. The 
AFL is the richest Australian sporting organisation and has a cultural significance 
unparalleled to any other football code in Australia.  In its latest Annual Report (AFL, 
2013a), the AFL’s annual revenue was $446 million, with average attendance at weekly 
matches of 32,414 in 2014.  It attracts the highest value for the licensing of its 
broadcasting rights, with the next round of negotiations valuing these rights close to 
AUD$1.6 billion in 2016. In terms of cultural significance, the AFL’s unmatched 
attendance figures and broadcast rights valuation, indicates its importance to the 
Australian populace, and further solidifies its dominance in the social field. Clearly, the 
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AFL’s popularity in this country has implications for the comparative health of its 
economic capital; the AFL is clearly well resourced and has the capacity to promote its 
objectives and offer its resources to assist in the promotion of the anti-doping regime. 
Following analysis of Essendon v ASADA, we contend that perceived authority 
as a result of symbolic capital is sometimes independent of any legal (legislative) 
authority an actor may possess.  In other words, the authority dominant actors such as 
the AFL yield within a social field may not be legally authorised. Meanwhile, the social 
field’s subordinate actors are limited in their ability to change the behaviours of the 
dominant actors, or greatly influence the habitus of the social field. As noted by O’Brien 
and Slack (2003), change may only occur when new actors that possess highly prized 
capital enter the social field and alter the habitus. However, the AFL’s dominance 
within its social field extends to heavy influence over those within or planning to enter 
the field, which thwarts the threat of influential new entrants challenging the status quo. 
6.1.2 Legitimate authority 
A key focus of this research was to determine the legitimate authority actors 
possess in order to regulate the anti-doping regime. As noted above, the AFL is seen as 
a dominant actor in the social field and as such, is perceived to have power, authority 
and influence over other actors. However, Bourdieu’s theory does not imply legitimate 
regulatory authority.  Access to significant levels of capital only offer a perception of 
regulatory authority or legitimacy. So we question, what actual legal authority do the 
actors in the social field possess?  Furthermore, is this legal authority influential in 
modifying behaviours relating to doping in sport? 
In terms of the involvement of the AFL in the investigation of the EFC, the 
question as to whether the AFL unduly influenced ASADA in order to position itself 
within the investigation, or whether ASADA simply required assistance from the AFL 
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in terms of economic and symbolic capital, is a cogent one. The findings suggest 
legitimate authority or legal accountability as represented through legislation and legal 
documents is somewhat unclear. ASADA, at least prior to the 2013 amendments, was 
necessarily dependent upon the AFL in carrying out the EFC investigation. For 
example, in the affidavit of then ASADA CEO, Aurora Andruska: “At this time, 
ASADA had no compulsory powers of its own and was generally reliant on the 
cooperation of sports bodies in order to be an effective regulator” (Andruska, 2014, 
paragraph 46.2). 
This statement demonstrates the disconnect between perceived authority on the 
one hand, and legal legitimacy on the other.  It is a result of this disconnect that the EFC 
filed proceedings in the Federal Court suggesting the collaboration between ASADA 
and the AFL was unlawful, thus rendering the show cause notices handed to players 
invalid. Therefore, the lawful relationship between the actors in the social field being 
investigated requires further consideration.  
6.2 Actors and their relationships within the social field 
The actors identified as occupying positions in the regulation of doping in sport 
in Australia, and specifically the case examined in this paper, includes the ACG, 
ASADA, the AFL and the EFC. Of course, other actors have influence in this social 
field, such as players, fans, media, and sponsors; however, the focus of this paper is on 
the dominant actors with authority to alter or influence behaviour as it relates to doping 
in sport. The dominant organisations in this social field are ASADA and the AFL. 
6.2.1 The Relationship between ASADA and the AFL 
Under the ASADA Act, the AFL is classified as a sport administration body 
(ASADA, 2006a). It must at all times have in place, maintain and enforce anti-doping 
policies and practices that comply with the WADA Code and the NAD Scheme. 
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Specifically, the AFL is required to cooperate with any investigations, and ensure its 
staff cooperates with the CEO of ASADA. Further, the AFL is required to provide the 
CEO of ASADA with appropriate details or reports relating to investigations, hearings, 
appeals and sanctions (ASADA, 2006b).  
ASADA has the legislative authority to enforce the anti-doping regime.  Under 
the ASADA Act and the NAD scheme, the CEO of ASADA is authorised to investigate 
possible anti-doping violations committed by athletes and support persons.  This 
legislative framework is the source of ASADA’s legal authority (ASADA 2006a; 
ASADA 2006b).  In order to perform its functions, ASADA necessarily has to interact 
with the sport governing body, and in the case of the AFL and the EFC, this played a 
pivotal role in the gathering of evidence to support the legality of the show cause 
notices to the EFC players and personnel.  As indicated above, the investigation cost the 
AFL $1.3million (Harcourt et al, 2014).  These costs were borne by the AFL and not 
directly by ASADA, saving recourse to taxpayer funds for that component of the 
investigation.  The costs associated with the AFL’s Anti-Doping Tribunal determination 
of the issues facing the EFC are yet to be quantified.   
6.2.2 The Relationship between ASADA and the EFC 
As the regulator with legislative authority to implement doping controls, 
ASADA has the direct right of access to clubs and players to investigate suspected 
doping violations.  In the case of the EFC, ASADA had direct access to the EFC players 
in order to perform its functions in the prosecution of the suspected doping violations.  
Amendments to the ASADA Act in August 2013 enhanced ASADA’s investigative 
powers by enabling the CEO to issue disclosure notices directly to suspected persons, 
who faced a significant penalty for non-compliance. Prior to these amendments, 
ASADA did not possess sufficient symbolic capital and depended upon the AFL’s 
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capital to enable it to perform its functions in the EFC investigation. The acquired social 
capital from its “partnership” with the AFL provided ASADA the opportunity to 
increase its symbolic power within the social field.  
6.2.3 The Relationship between the AFL and the EFC 
Within this social field, the relationship between the AFL and EFC is based on 
the law of contract and a system of trust, underpinned by a network of economic and 
personal relationships, incorporating additional ingredients of cultural and social norms. 
The AFL possesses high levels of symbolic capital, enabling it to assert dominance 
within this social field.  The AFL utilises a range of regulatory tools to control and 
influence the behaviour of the EFC, including licensing, salary caps, codes of conduct 
and significantly, control over players through the tripartite contractual arrangements 
(Harcourt et al., 2014).  The benefits bestowed upon the EFC in this relationship enable 
the EFC to participate within the national competition and receive financial and other 
support from the AFL.  
6.3 The Legitimate Regulator 
The legal framework provided by the ASADA Act and the NAD Scheme 
supported the expectation that ASADA would be the ultimate and dominant regulator in 
managing the EFC investigation. It had the mandate as the driving force for “pure 
performance in sport” (ASADA, 2006a) backed by the Australian Federal Government.  
However, when put to the test, gaps were exposed in the legislative regime, resulting in 
the subject matter for determination in the EFC Court Proceedings and reflected in the 
judgment that ASADA was expected to cooperate with the AFL. In reality, and as 
demonstrated from the materials analysed, this regulatory function of implementing the 
anti-doping regime necessarily relied upon actors external to ASADA and diluted the 
effect of ASADA’s legitimate authority in the social field. Furthermore, ASADA 
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became aware of its limited investigative capabilities and as a result, applied for 
changes in the ASADA Act, which came into effect in August 2013. Senator Humphries 
(Australian Federal Government, 2014a) acknowledged that: 
Recent developments have raised serious questions about what is going on 
inside our major sporting codes. Ultimately, we do accept the argument that 
ASADA needs further powers to expand its investigations into doping, but those 
powers need to be limited and they need to be fully compatible with 
fundamental legal and human rights that we value so highly in this country. 
Interestingly, ASADA’s new CEO, Ben McDevitt acknowledged ASADA’s limitations 
and lack of capital in handling the EFC investigation (ABC Grandstand, 2014). He 
commented that, “the reality is that I don't think ASADA was ready for an investigation 
of this magnitude” (McDevitt, 2014). 
The 2013 ASADA amendments did not include increased financial resources to 
ensure ASADA the capacity to effectively exert its new investigative power.  Nor did 
the ASADA powers extend to compelling answers at interviews (Andruska, 2014). 
Collaborating with the AFL provided a means to gain resources and access to the clubs 
implicated in the ACC report. The EFC, through its tripartite agreement with the AFL, 
had no option but to comply with the investigation once the AFL was involved. The 
Federal Court proceedings initiated by the EFC targeted the unlawful investigation 
undertaken by ASADA, but did not seek to extend its scope to challenge the AFL’s 
involvement in the investigation.  However, through evidence adduced in the court 
proceedings, and specifically, the evidence of the then CEO, Aurora Andruska, there 
were a number of significant revelations that demonstrated that the AFL was motivated 
to protect its symbolic capital and, specifically, commercial factors such as its brand, the 
effect on grand final ticket sales and the need to have the matter resolved before the 
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2013 finals.  For example, in terms of the symbolic capital of the AFL, Andruska (2014) 
stated in her affidavit that, 
In this meeting, Mr McLaughlan said that the AFL was concerned because a 
survey they had conducted suggested that ‘for the first time faith in the game has 
been challenged’. Mr McLauchlan also said he was concerned about the 
‘integrity of the 2013 season’ and for the ‘brand and competition’.  He discussed 
the timing of the conclusion of the investigation and the timing of the 2013 final 
series (paragraph 36).   
An example of the commercial motivations and interests of the AFL can be found in the 
diary note dated 4 June 2013 and annexed to the Affidavit of Aurora Andruska 
(Andruska, 2014) as annexure AA-11 referring to the ‘1 million tickets’ to be sold and 
the impact of the ASADA investigation on the interests of the AFL. 
As the governing body and regulator of Australian rules football, the AFL was 
able to leverage off the results of the ASADA investigation and act to protect the 
integrity of its sport by imposing sanctions against the EFC and a number of support 
personnel and officials.  The AFL’s effectiveness as a regulator was supported by those 
in the social field, despite its lack of legislative legal authority. What has emerged from 
the findings is that the AFL’s access to resources, including the internal integrity unit 
and its contractual control over players, further cemented its position of power, 
influence and domination within the social field (Everett, 2002). The AFL was 
perceived by other field occupants as the dominant actor appropriately wielding power 
and influence to protect its vested interests. In terms of dominance, one conclusion can 
be drawn that the AFL was in reality the actor with greater levels of symbolic capital to 
underwrite its actions. Unfortunately, ASADA has lost social and symbolic capital and 
consequently, much of its legitimacy, as result of ‘unfavourable’ media following 
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statements from the EFC undermining the investigation conducted by ASADA (Warner, 
2014).  
The concern raised in this paper is that perceived authority, which is based upon 
high amounts of organisational capital, does not equate to actual legal (and therefore, 
legitimate) authority. The central plank of the EFC Court Proceedings was to question 
the legitimacy of the joint investigation by finding that ASADA acted beyond its 
powers, and undermined the objective of the anti-doping regime. The mere fact that this 
action was brought by the EFC demonstrates that there was confusion as to the 
legitimacy and authority of ASADA. The Federal Court judgment has reinforced 
ASADA’s position, but did not comment on the lack of legitimate legal authority of the 
AFL. Taxpayer resources were expended by ASADA in defending allegations 
questioning its legitimacy. The EFC did not appeal the Federal Court finding that 
ASADA was acting within its power and authority.  However, James Hird appealed to 
the Full Court of the Federal Court but lost the appeal in Hird v Chief Executive Officer 
of the Australian Ant-Doping Authority [2015] FCAFC 7   ASADA was represented at 
the appeal, with the expenditure of more taxpayer resources allocated towards 
responding to the appeal. 
In defining legitimacy, Suchman (1995) intimated that organisational legitimacy 
is “a generalised perception,” and is, “appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (p. 574).  Thus, habitus within a social 
field is determined by dominant organisations within that field; hence, perceptions of 
legitimacy are the product of these dominant organisations and their determination of 
habitus (Ihlen, 2007). The findings of this paper suggest actors within a social field 
perceive dominant actors as the legitimate regulators of behaviour in that space, 
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regardless of the legal authority they may or may not possess. In the case of the EFC, 
the AFL emerged as the dominant regulator in the social field being investigated. 
7. Conclusion 
As highlighted in the EFC case, perceptions of legitimate authority cause 
concern when organisations operate outside their lawful frameworks, thus leaving 
loopholes for legal challenges. After a review of the EFC Court Proceedings, it was 
evident that, in carrying out their regulatory functions and assisting ASADA to enforce 
the objectives of the ASADA Act and NAD Scheme, ASADA and the AFL exchanged 
information and collaborated in the investigation of the EFC. Access to the AFL’s 
symbolic capital, resources and forensic capabilities was a critical component to enable 
ASADA to complete the investigation and to issue the show cause notices to the EFC 
players.  
In the application of Bourdeau’s social theory, the AFL, despite its lack of 
legislative authority, acted with ASADA as a legitimate regulator and utilised its 
extensive symbolic capital to exert authority in this social field. This research employed 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework to highlight the importance of organisational capital 
within a social field. In so doing, the study expands the notion that symbolic capital is 
sometimes perceived as a source of legitimate authority and regulation within social 
fields, and points to some of the deleterious consequences of this “misrecognition” of 
legitimacy  
In the case analysed, the EFC Court Proceedings question the collaboration of 
the AFL and ASADA in regulating anti-doping and have exposed a loophole in the 
regulatory framework of the anti-doping regime. A retrospective analysis of the EFC 
investigation demonstrates that ASADA’s inadequate legislative framework meant that 
it depended upon other actors with greater symbolic power – in this case, the AFL. As a 
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result of ASADA’s dependency on the AFL, the symbolic capital of the AFL was 
increased, thus further enhancing its dominant position within the social field. The 
investigation into the EFC highlights the urgent need to fill the regulatory gap identified 
in this paper to ensure that a clear legislative framework is established as the platform 
upon which ASADA bases its operations in the future pursuit of pure performance in 
sport.  
 
Afterword 
The AFL’s Anti-Doping Tribunal handed down a decision on 31 March 2015 
that it was not comfortably satisfied that any player violated the AFL’s Anti-Doping 
Code.  Following this decision, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) issued 
notification that it was exercising its independent right and appealing the decision of the 
AFL Tribunal to the Court of Arbitration (CAS) of Sport. A panel of CAS arbitrators 
has been appointed and the matter has been set down for hearing on 16 November 2015 
in Sydney (Court of Arbitration, 2015).  
The ramifications of this decision to appeal means that the CAS will examine 
the evidence and opens the way for the possibility of a different outcome and finding of 
anti-doping rule violations and the imposition of sanctions. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to postulate about exactly what that decision will be, but the fact that WADA has 
exercised its right to appeal suggests a question over the efficacy of the existing 
regulatory oversight of the anti-doping regime in Australia. 
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